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INVOLUNTARY BANKRUPTCY  
FOR AMERICAN STATES 
ADAM FEIBELMAN 
The history [of Congress’ bankruptcy power] is one of an 
expanding concept. It is, however, an expanding concept that has 
had to fight its way. Almost every change has been hotly denounced 
in its beginnings as a usurpation of power. Only time or judicial 
decision has had capacity to silence opposition.1 
 
This essay began as an act of whimsy and provocation. Its central 
argument—that any bankruptcy regime created for American states 
should include an involuntary component—is well beyond the scope 
of current discussions among legal scholars and policymakers who are 
exploring the possibility of extending bankruptcy law to the States. 
While various writers and policymakers have recently advocated or 
considered allowing states to obtain relief in bankruptcy,2 as one 
writer puts it, “no one is proposing involuntary bankruptcy for 
states.”3 
 
 Sumter Davis Marks Professor of Corporate and Business Law, Tulane University. Thanks to 
Onnig Dombalagian, Melissa Jacoby, Keith Werhan, Ernest Young, and participants in the 
Duke Journal of Constitutional Law and Public Policy symposium, “The Consequences and 
Constitutional Dilemmas of State Debt,” for helpful comments and conversation. 
 1.  Ashton v. Cameron Cnty. Water Improvement Dist., 298 U.S. 513, 535 (1936) 
(Cardozo, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 2.  See generally, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Extending Bankruptcy Law to States: Is It 
Constitutional?, in WHEN STATES GO BROKE: ORIGINS, CONTEXT, AND SOLUTIONS FOR THE 
AMERICAN STATES IN FISCAL CRISIS (Peter Conti-Brown & David Skeel eds., 2012); Steven L. 
Schwarcz, A Minimalist Approach to State “Bankruptcy”, 59 UCLA L. REV. 322 (2011); David 
A. Skeel, Jr., States of Bankruptcy, Univ. of Pa. Law School, Public Law Research Paper No. 
11–30 (2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? abstract_id=1907774; David 
Solan, State Bankruptcy: Surviving a Tenth Amendment Challenge, 42 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 
217 (2012); Lisa Lambert, State Bankruptcy Bill Imminent, Gingrich Says, REUTERS (Jan. 21, 
2011, 5:57 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/21/us-usa-states-bankruptcy-idUSTRE 
70K6PI20110121. 
 3.  McConnell, supra note 2, at 229. Some writers have discussed the possibility of 
involuntary bankruptcy for sovereigns. See, e.g., Patrick Bolton & David A. Skeel, Jr., Inside the 
Black Box: How Should a Sovereign Bankruptcy Framework Be Structured, 53 EMORY L.J. 763, 
786–87 (2004). 
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Until now. And with inspiration from Justice Cardozo’s 
observation quoted above, what began as whimsy and provocation has 
become an argument—one that now seems more plausible than it did 
at the outset of this project. As Part I explains, there is a strong 
economic justification for an involuntary component of a bankruptcy 
regime in general. Debtors are predictably inclined to delay or avoid 
seeking available relief, thereby incurring unnecessary costs and 
losses that fall upon their creditors and other stakeholders. 
Governmental debtors are similar to other debtors in this regard. 
Part II describes how sovereign governments—motivated by political 
pressures, concerns over access to credit markets, and optimism about 
economic improvements—predictably delay or avoid seeking debt 
relief when they suffer financial distress. Because governments in 
financial crisis can continue to collect tax revenues to fund their 
obligations, and because they enjoy broad immunity from suit and 
from enforcement of judgments against them, they have significant 
latitude to kick the can down the road until their financial situations 
become acute or resolve themselves. Meanwhile, their obligations 
accumulate, diluting each other, and some of their assets may be 
depleted. 
Although American states have averted acute financial distress in 
the modern era, Part II argues that they would likely delay seeking 
relief if they were to face an unfolding financial crisis as other 
governmental debtors have done. If the goal of allowing American 
states to file for bankruptcy is to reduce the likelihood or the scope of 
financial support from the federal government, that goal could remain 
largely unrealized by an exclusively voluntary bankruptcy regime. 
There is a real possibility that the benefits of allowing states to file for 
bankruptcy could be slight compared to the costs that states will incur 
and externalize as a result of their delay in voluntarily seeking relief. 
Part III proposes that, if bankruptcy law is extended to states, the 
federal government be authorized to initiate a bankruptcy case for a 
state when it is likely to need financial assistance from the federal 
government or is likely to impose financial costs or harms on the rest 
of the nation. Once a state is involuntarily placed in the bankruptcy 
system, however, no other involuntary consequences need follow. 
Under the model regime described in Part III, the state would be 
given the option to exit bankruptcy at its discretion after a short 
period, during which time it would benefit from a stay on actions 
against it. This protection would be more comprehensive than its 
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immunity from suit or enforcement. If the state elected, it could utilize 
the bankruptcy forum to negotiate with stakeholders and propose a 
plan that, among other things, would bind holdout creditors. 
An involuntary procedure would not assure that states obtain 
relief sooner than they otherwise would. The federal government 
might itself delay invoking the procedure, perhaps for reasons similar 
to those that would deter the state from voluntarily seeking relief in 
bankruptcy. Furthermore, a state forced into bankruptcy might choose 
to exit without submitting a plan for restructuring if the option to exit 
were available. Nonetheless, the inclusion of an involuntary procedure 
in any state bankruptcy regime should at least increase the chances 
that a state in financial distress would obtain bankruptcy relief and 
would obtain it somewhat earlier than it otherwise would. 
The commentary on extending bankruptcy protection to states 
assumes, often without inquiry, that an involuntary bankruptcy 
provision for states would be impermissible under the U.S. 
Constitution. Two Supreme Court cases from the 1930s that examined 
the constitutionality of the U.S. municipal bankruptcy regime include 
dicta supporting this view. Part IV argues that constitutional 
impediments to a state bankruptcy regime with an involuntary 
component are much less robust than courts, commentators, and 
scholars assume. A narrowly drawn bankruptcy regime for states that 
could be triggered by the federal government only if a state were 
likely to need financial assistance or threatened domestic financial 
stability should be able to navigate constitutional doctrines of state 
sovereignty. American states are not unqualifiedly sovereign, and 
their sovereignty is not so expansive that it can prevent the federal 
government from protecting fundamental national economic and 
financial interests when a state faces financial crisis. 
I. INVOLUNTARY BANKRUPTCY 
Bankruptcy can serve a variety of important functions. It can 
increase the overall return for creditors of an insolvent debtor and 
ensure the timely and equitable allocation and recognition of losses 
stemming from a failing debtor.4 Simply by halting a race to collect 
assets from a debtor in financial distress, a bankruptcy regime can 
 
 4.  See, e.g., World Bank, 2011 Principles for Effective Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor 
Regimes, at 6 (2011), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTGILD/Resources/ 
ICRPrinciples_Jan2011.pdf. 
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help preserve the value of the debtor’s assets for the benefit of all 
creditors.5 Bankruptcy can also provide a process and a forum for 
restructuring the debtor’s obligations to increase its value as a going 
concern for the benefit of its creditors and other stakeholders.6 
But these functions of bankruptcy often depend on the regime 
being employed in a timely fashion. The consequences of avoiding or 
delaying bankruptcy when a debtor is in financial distress can be 
significant and, in some cases, determinative. Financial distress is itself 
costly to debtors and to other stakeholders.7 A debtor’s productivity 
may decline while it is distracted by financial distress, and it will likely 
incur direct costs in navigating its distress. If it defaults on obligations 
or delays in payment, its creditors will shift their losses back on the 
debtor if they are able, causing the debtor to suffer additional distress-
related obligations. Debtors in distress will also likely have pressing 
financing needs and will generally be required to pay more for credit 
than financially healthy firms. Any new costly financing will further 
dilute existing claims.8 Meanwhile, the debtor may be hemorrhaging 
assets in its effort to stay afloat or due to poor management. 
If a private debtor’s indebtedness worsens or its assets are 
depleted, the overall insolvency-state return for creditors tends to 
decline. If the debtor faces liquidation, there will be less to share 
among a larger group of claims. If there is initially a chance that the 
debtor could be successfully reorganized, it may become significantly 
more challenging to do so as the debtor slides deeper into financial 
distress. It will have fewer assets to employ as a going concern and 
greater short- and medium-term financing needs; it may also have 
squandered commercial opportunities and goodwill that it could more 
profitably exploit as a restructured entity. 
Despite the costs and pitfalls of delay in the face of financial 
distress, debtors are predictably inclined to avoid or delay voluntarily 
seeking debt relief for some significant amount of time after it is in 
their and their creditors’ interest to seek relief. Significant numbers of 
individuals and households in the United States forgo substantial 
 
 5.  See, e.g., Adam Feibelman, Federal Bankruptcy Law and State Sovereign Immunity, 81 
TEX. L. REV. 1381, 1419–20 (2003). 
 6.  See, e.g., World Bank, supra note 4, at 6. 
 7.  See Adam Feibelman, Defining the Social Insurance Function of Consumer 
Bankruptcy, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 129, 166 (2005) (discussing the costs of financial 
distress). 
 8.  See, e.g., Bolton & Skeel, supra note 3, at 786. 
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relief available to them under bankruptcy law.9 Faltering business 
debtors routinely delay seeking available relief, often needlessly 
expending resources that would be useful in a reorganization or that 
would increase the insolvency-state returns of their creditors.10 
There are numerous interrelated explanations for debtors’ delay 
in seeking debt relief when they experience financial distress. They 
may be overly optimistic about their future prospects for financial 
recovery and believe that debt relief will ultimately be unnecessary. 
They may be uninformed or poorly informed about the relief 
available to them. They may be deterred by stigma or concerns about 
reputation. Managers of a corporate debtor may reasonably fear that 
they will lose their positions if their firm files for bankruptcy. 
Because the inclination of debtors to delay or avoid seeking debt 
relief can frustrate the primary goals of bankruptcy, most bankruptcy 
regimes around the globe provide that debtors can be forced into 
bankruptcy involuntarily in at least some circumstances.11 Under the 
U.S. Bankruptcy Code, for example, three or more unsecured or 
under-secured claimholders whose unsecured claims total more than 
$14,425 can file an involuntary petition in Chapters 11 and 7 against 
consumer and commercial debtors.12 
 
 9.  See generally Michelle White, Why Don’t More Households File for Bankruptcy?, 14 
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 205 (1998) (noting that a “higher fraction of U.S. households would benefit 
financially from bankruptcy than actually file”).  
 10.  See, e.g., Susan Block-Lieb, Why Creditors File So Few Involuntary Petitions and Why 
the Number Is Not Too Small, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 803, 835 (1991) (quoting Report of the 
Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st 
Sess., pt. I, at 14 (1973), reprinted in LAWRENCE P. KING ET AL., COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 
APP. VOL. 2 (15th ed. 1979) (“[A] major factor explaining the smallness of distributions in 
business bankruptcies is the delay in the institution of proceedings for liquidation until assets 
are largely depleted.”)). 
 11.  World Bank, supra note 4, at 16 (“Both debtors and creditors should be entitled to 
apply for insolvency proceedings.”); UNCITRAL, LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON INSOLVENCY LAW 
54 (2004), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/05-80722_Ebook.pdf 
(noting that most jurisdictions allow involuntary proceedings for liquidation but not all 
jurisdictions allow involuntary reorganization proceedings); Segio Muro, Deciding on an 
Efficient Involuntary Bankruptcy Filing Petition Rule, Cornell Law School Graduate Student 
Papers, no. 6, at 23 (2003), available at http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/lps_papers/6 
(“Whatever the special approach taken by the legal system, bankruptcy laws traditionally 
maintain that creditors’ filings will help to bring recalcitrant, absconding or maybe just 
overconfident debtors into bankruptcy.”). In fact, bankruptcy law originally was exclusively an 
involuntary creditors’ remedy. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, The Initiation Problem in 
Bankruptcy, 11 INT’L REV. L. ECON. 223, 225 (1991). 
 12.  11 U.S.C.A. § 303(b)(1) (West 2010). “[I]f there are fewer than 12 such holders . . . one 
or more of such holders that hold in the aggregate at least $14,425 of such claims” can file an 
involuntary petition. Id. at § 303(b)(2). 
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Once an involuntary petition is filed under the Code, the debtor 
has an opportunity to answer and controvert the petition.13 If the 
debtor does so, the bankruptcy case can nonetheless proceed if “the 
debtor is generally not paying such debtor’s debts as such debts 
become due unless such debts are the subject of a bona fide dispute.”14 
If a court dismisses an involuntary petition, the petitioning creditors 
can be forced to pay the debtor’s costs or attorney’s fees; if a creditor 
is found to have acted in bad faith, it can be liable for any losses or 
costs caused by their action or for punitive damages.15 Furthermore, 
“except to the extent that the court orders otherwise, . . . any business 
of the debtor may continue to operate, and the debtor may continue 
to use, acquire, or dispose of property as if an involuntary case 
concerning the debtor had not been commenced.”16 
In theory, the availability of involuntary bankruptcy is an 
appealing and important component of a bankruptcy system.17 
Unsecured creditors as a group are in a uniquely good position to pull 
the bankruptcy trigger when it is most beneficial to do so. They 
generally have fewer reasons than their debtors to delay filing a 
bankruptcy petition, and they have strong motivations to file an 
involuntary petition if delay would waste a debtor’s assets or its 
going-concern value. If a debtor becomes insolvent or nears 
insolvency, then (at least some) unsecured creditors will bear the first 
loss among creditors. Any diminution in the value of the debtor at 
that point continues to reduce the unsecured creditors’ collective 
return. On the other hand, if entering bankruptcy would be more 
costly than beneficial, the unsecured creditors will likely bear those 
costs. Thus, unsecured creditors as a group should internalize both the 
costs and benefits of timely filing for bankruptcy more than most or 
 
 13.  Id. at § 303(d). “If the petition is not timely controverted, the court shall order relief 
against the debtor in an involuntary case under the chapter under which the petition was filed.” 
Id. at § 303(h). 
 14.  Id. at § 303(h)(1). An involuntary case can also proceed if “within 120 days before the 
date of the filing of the petition, a custodian . . . was appointed or took possession.” Id. at            
§ 303(h)(2). 
 15.  Id. at § 303(i). A petitioning creditor can be required to post a bond “to indemnify the 
debtor for such [damages] as the court may later allow.” Id. at § 303(e). 
 16.  Id. at § 303(f). 
 17.  There is surprisingly little commentary or scholarship on the general approach or on 
specific provisions of particular bankruptcy regimes. Notable works on the topic include 
THOMAS JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 193–209 (1986); Baird, 
supra note 11; Block-Lieb, supra note 10; Susan Block-Lieb, Fishing in Muddy Waters: 
Clarifying the Common Pool Analogy as Applied to the Standard for Commencement of a 
Bankruptcy Case, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 337 (1993); Muro, supra note 11. 
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all other stakeholders, including the debtor. 
The foregoing suggests that creditors would exercise their power 
to force commercial debtors into bankruptcy with some frequency. As 
Douglas Baird has noted, “[t]his trigger is so easy for a creditor to pull 
that it might seem likely that bankruptcy would begin too early rather 
than too late. Only a few creditors need to get together to invoke the 
scrutiny of the bankruptcy court and ask if the debtor has a future.”18 
In fact, however, involuntary bankruptcy petitions are an extremely 
small percentage of all bankruptcy filings in the United States.19 
There are various explanations for this, none of which are 
mutually exclusive. The requirements for filing an involuntary petition 
may still be forbidding in some circumstances.20 The potential liability 
for filing an involuntary petition that is subsequently dismissed may 
also discourage some creditors.21 Perhaps more profoundly, if 
unsecured creditors are in a good position to internalize the net 
benefits of an involuntary petition, this is true of creditors in the 
collective, but not individually. As Baird notes: 
Ordinarily, one can depend upon the party that benefits from a 
particular legal rule to invoke it. Bankruptcy is different. The 
beneficiaries of bankruptcy law are the creditors as a whole, not 
individual creditors within the group. One wants a bankruptcy 
proceeding to begin when it is in the collective interest of the 
group, but one must still depend upon someone to initiate it. One 
must somehow ensure that when a bankruptcy proceeding is in the 
collective interest of the creditors, it is also in someone’s individual 
interest as well.22 
Thus, while all of a debtor’s creditors might benefit from forcing 
the debtor into bankruptcy, they will enjoy that benefit only if three 
(or fewer in certain circumstances) creditors file a petition on their 
behalf. But any single creditor may not be motivated to join in doing 
so: it would bear the direct and indirect costs of filing and could face 
liability if the petition is dismissed.23 This is a collective action 
 
 18.  Baird, supra note 11, at 224. 
 19.  Block-Lieb, supra note 10, at 803–04 & n.6. 
 20.  See, e.g., id. at 806 (exploring the continuing challenges for creditors under § 303); 
Muro, supra note 11, at 25–29 (describing the U.S. bankruptcy regime as “debtor’s choice” 
because of the challenges creditors face in forcing a debtor into bankruptcy). 
 21.  See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, A General Theory of the Dynamics of the State 
Remedies/Bankruptcy System, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 311, 353 (1982). 
 22.  Baird, supra note 11, at 223 (citations omitted). 
 23.  Id. at 224. 
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problem: “Because creditors largely lack the incentive to begin the 
bankruptcy proceeding, American bankruptcy law depends upon 
those who control the corporate debtor under nonbankruptcy law to 
start it.”24 
Furthermore, creditors may not have sufficient information to 
know when to force their debtors into bankruptcy. “Those best 
positioned to know both the financial condition of the firm and the 
likelihood that creditors will assert their nonbankruptcy default rights 
are the managers of the firm. Individual creditors lack a sense of the 
overall, day-to-day health of the firm.”25 Although creditors can be 
effective monitors of their debtors, “[c]reditors on the whole . . . tend 
to specialize”26 and may not individually have a comprehensive sense 
of the condition of their common debtor.27 In any event, creditors 
often do not need to utilize an involuntary bankruptcy provision to 
force a debtor into bankruptcy. Creditors can do so by refusing to 
forbear or provide additional financing or by taking actions to collect 
upon obligations.28  
Finally, most creditors resolve issues with their debtors outside of 
bankruptcy. In some cases, the parties prefer a less adversarial 
approach, perhaps to preserve relationships or to maintain a 
reputation for flexibility. In other cases, bankruptcy is simply 
unnecessary. “[T]he nonbankruptcy world of debt collection [is] a 
world in which individual creditors can threaten the survival of the 
firm as a going concern by threatening to seize its assets.”29 
Taken together, these observations underscore an important point: 
even when given the power to trigger a debtor’s bankruptcy, creditors 
will often themselves delay or avoid forcing their debtor into 
bankruptcy. This does not mean, however, that a provision for 
involuntary bankruptcy has no value for commercial creditors and 
their debtors. First, although they are rare, involuntary filings do 
happen. In hundreds of cases in the United States each year, creditors 
 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Id. at 230–31. Baird notes potential strategies to overcome this information asymmetry, 
like allowing managers to keep their jobs if they file for bankruptcy at the right time or perhaps 
compensating them for doing so. Id. 
 28.  See, e.g., Block-Lieb, supra note 10, at 804 (“The line between voluntary and 
involuntary filings is an ambiguous one because debtors often file voluntary petitions in reaction 
to creditors’ collection efforts.”). 
 29.  Baird, supra note 11, at 228. 
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do in fact force their debtors into bankruptcy sooner than the debtor 
would have sought relief itself.30 Second, there is always the chance 
that creditors of a debtor in financial distress might pull the trigger, 
which may motivate debtors to seek formal relief earlier. Third, and 
relatedly, the availability of involuntary bankruptcy likely gives 
creditors some leverage to renegotiate with the debtor to make 
bankruptcy unnecessary. 
II. THE PUBLIC DEBTOR 
The potential benefits of exposing government debtors to 
involuntary bankruptcy are similar to those of private debtors. Like 
other debtors—perhaps more so—government debtors in financial 
distress consistently avoid or delay taking steps to restructure their 
obligations until doing so is unavoidable. In addition to the reasons 
that private debtors delay or avoid seeking relief noted above, 
government actors are subject to political constraints and may fear 
that they will be punished at the ballot box for steering their 
government into bankruptcy.31 This Part argues that, in theory, the 
case for involuntary sovereign bankruptcy is strong and the case for 
involuntary state bankruptcy is even stronger. 
A. Sovereigns 
Few American states have faced acute financial crises in the 
modern era, but numerous sovereigns have done so and their 
experiences are illuminating.32 Although there is no bankruptcy 
regime or formal debt-restructuring mechanism available to sovereign 
debtors, there is a familiar ad hoc process for sovereign debt 
restructuring.33 And while dozens of sovereigns have gone through 
this process in recent decades, they have consistently triggered the 
process well after the time that relief would have been most 
 
 30.  See, e.g., Muro, supra note 11, at 26 (quoting David S. Kennedy et al., The Involuntary 
Banruptcy Process: A Study of the Relevant Statutory and Procedural Provisions and Related 
Matters, 31 U. MEM. L. REV. 1, 3 (2000)). 
 31.  Christoph Trebesch, Delays in Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Should We Really 
Blame the Creditors? 3 (Mar. 25, 2008) (unpublished paper), available at 
http://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/gdec08/44.html (reporting evidence “that political risk and 
government behavior might be a much more important reason for restructuring delays than 
creditor behavior”). 
 32.  See generally, e.g., Adam Feibelman, American States and Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring, in WHEN STATES GO BROKE: ORIGINS, CONTEXT, AND SOLUTIONS FOR THE 
AMERICAN STATES IN FISCAL CRISIS (Peter Conti-Brown & David Skeel eds., 2012). 
 33.  See  id. at 158–71 (describing recent sovereign debt restructurings). 
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beneficial.34 The recent experience of Greece illuminates the 
foregoing points. For a variety of reasons, Greece faced fewer formal 
impediments to restructuring its debt than most sovereigns in a 
similar financial and economic position.35 And yet it took two years of 
acute crisis for the country to restructure any of its obligations.36 
As the unfolding Greek episode reflects, governments are 
uniquely able to persist with unsustainable obligations for extended 
periods of time, in some cases indefinitely. Absent acute crises, 
sovereigns almost always have access to some revenues that they can 
use to pay creditors, even at the cost of allocating insufficient 
resources to the public goods they provide. Furthermore, sovereigns 
may be especially hesitant to anger private creditors for fear that they 
will be excluded from credit markets in the future. They may also be 
hesitant to anger private creditors’ home governments or important 
official creditors for geopolitical reasons.37 
Thus, sovereign debtors trigger the process of debt restructuring 
when they reach the point of acute crisis. These crises are occasioned 
 
 34.  See Bolton & Skeel, supra note 3, at 786 (explaining that sovereigns tend to “default 
too late”); Anna Gelpern, Bankruptcy, Backwards: The Problem of Quasi-Sovereign Debt, 121 
YALE L.J. 888, 927 (2012) (“In most cases, the debt restructuring option is invoked too late in 
hindsight—a problem that sovereign bankruptcy proposals have sought to solve.”); ANNE O. 
KRUEGER, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, A NEW APPROACH TO SOVEREIGN DEBT 
RESTRUCTURING 1 (2002), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/exrp/sdrm/eng 
/sdrm.pdf (noting the “tendency for debtors to delay restructuring until the last possible 
moment, increasing the likelihood that the process will be associated with substantial 
uncertainty and loss of asset values, to the detriment of debtors and creditors alike”). 
 35.  See, e.g., Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, How to Restructure Greek Debt 4–6 (May 
7, 2010) (working paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1603304. 
 36.  In early 2010, it was revealed that Greece had been disguising its financial condition, 
which was much worse than markets realized. See Nelson D. Schwarz et al., Wall St. Helped to 
Mask Debt Fueling Europe’s Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2010), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/14/business/global/14debt.html?pagewanted=all. This quickly 
led to the onset of acute crisis and an initial rescue from the IMF and Eurozone countries. See 
Press Release, International Monetary Fund, IMF Executive Board Approves $30 Billion 
Stand-By Arrangement for Greece (May 9, 2010), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/ 
sec/pr/2010/pr10187.htm. Greece successfully restructured $206 billion in obligations in March 
2012. See Richard Milne, Greek Deal Will Buy Time but Hard Work Lies Ahead, FIN. TIMES 
(Mar. 7, 2012, 9:49 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/226d36c4-6875-11e1-a6cc-
00144feabdc0.html#ax zz1q3A8hk7X. 
 37.  See generally, Anna Gelpern, Odious, Not Debt, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 101 
(2007) (observing the large portion of sovereign debt owed to official creditors and describing 
the political dimensions of those financial relationships); W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Contracting 
for State Intervention: The Origins of Sovereign Debt Arbitration, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
335 (2010) (exploring how arbitration clauses in sovereign debt contracts historically enabled 
creditors’ home states to intervene in disputes over their private claims against sovereign 
debtors). 
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by some combination of familiar if harrowing circumstances: a 
country’s currency collapses, its banking system freezes, there is a 
flight of foreign investment, the country cannot meet payments 
coming due, it is effectively excluded from private credit markets.38 
When any combination of these things happens to a sovereign, it must 
generally impose losses on its creditors, obtain financial support from 
the official sector (usually lead by the IMF), or both.39 By the time a 
sovereign reaches this point, however, the costs of crisis are likely 
greater than they would have been if the sovereign had acted earlier, 
perhaps only slightly earlier. 
Numerous commentators, policymakers, and market participants 
have argued, therefore, that the process of sovereign debt 
restructuring should encourage sovereigns to avoid delay.40 This is a 
primary motivation behind a growing list of proposals for a sovereign 
bankruptcy regime or debt-restructuring mechanism. The literature 
on sovereign bankruptcy has not satisfactorily addressed, however, 
how a formal mechanism would actually prod sovereigns to seek 
relief earlier than they do under the current ad hoc approach. Other 
than making the process of debt relief more manageable and 
predictable, proposals do not include any measures that would 
directly alter sovereigns’ incentives to delay and avoid reckoning. And 
the goal of making sovereign debt restructuring easier and more 
manageable is hardly uncontroversial. Making it easier for sovereigns 
to obtain debt relief earlier may exacerbate moral hazard.41 
Although sovereign nations are not likely to accede to any 
international agreement allowing for involuntary sovereign 
bankruptcy, at least some writers have observed that an involuntary 
procedure for sovereigns could be beneficial.42 It could provide a 
mechanism for stemming the costs and losses caused by sovereign 
debt crises, and it might also reduce the incentives that governments 
have to accumulate unsustainable obligations in the first place. 
 
 
 38.  See, e.g., Feibelman, supra note 32, at 156–57. 
 39.  See, e.g., id. at 169. 
 40.  See generally, e.g., Gelpern, supra note 34. 
 41.  See, e.g., Feibelman, supra note 32, at 184–85; Steven L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring: A Bankruptcy Reorganization Approach, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 101, 130–31 (2002) 
(discussing moral hazard effects of bankruptcy protection). 
 42.  See, e.g., Bolton & Skeel, supra note 3, at 786–87 (describing “the greater merit in 
recommending involuntary bankruptcy than is often appreciated”). 
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The theoretical case for involuntary sovereign bankruptcy may be 
especially strong for sovereigns that are members of a monetary 
union. Again, as the situation in Europe illustrates, members of a 
monetary union have a strong interest in ensuring that every member 
avoid financial distress and that they stem financial woes before a 
crisis materializes. The costs of a member’s financial crisis will likely 
be externalized upon the union, and those costs could be magnified 
within and beyond the union through formal financial linkages and 
contagion. A union-level involuntary bankruptcy mechanism could 
give union members a way to protect themselves from this 
vulnerability, although it is entirely possible that other union members 
and union institutions might themselves delay forcing a member of 
the union into debt relief.43 Recent reforms of the Euro zone’s 
Growth and Stability Pact can be understood as attempting to address 
this vulnerability ex ante.44 
B. States 
Recent financial and economic conditions have raised the specter 
of one or more American states experiencing some form of financial 
distress.45 If that occurred, it would presumably impose external costs 
and losses on other states and on the federal government, much like a 
member of a monetary union externalizes costs and losses upon the 
union.46 And like sovereigns in monetary unions, those costs and 
losses may be magnified due to systemic linkages and to contagion. 47 
A state in crisis that delays obtaining debt relief would 
presumably impose even greater costs and losses on other states and 
 
 43.  This is especially true if a bankruptcy or restructuring might impose direct, immediate 
costs or externalities across the union. Union members may at least be inclined to act earlier 
than a sovereign would act voluntarily, however, and seeking relief even slightly earlier may 
make a significant difference in this context. 
 44.  See, e.g., Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and 
Monetary Union (Jan. 1, 2012), available at http://www.european-council.europa.eu/media/ 
579087/treaty.pdf. 
 45.  See, e.g., Skeel, supra note 2, at 2 (“In the past several years, however, the possibility of 
a state default has begun to look a little less imaginary.”); Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 324 
(“There is a rising consensus, however, that these measures will not be enough, and that states 
will also need debt relief.”). 
 46.  See, e.g., Skeel, supra note 2, at 21–22 (discussing the possibility of a federal bailout of 
a state in financial distress and describing the alternative of state default as “the financial 
equivalent of a tsunami”). 
 47.  See Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 324 (“[I]f a default by one state undermines investor 
confidence in all state debt, the broader market in that debt might collapse.”); Gelpern, supra 
note 34, at 911 (noting that a state default is “likely to be systemically disruptive”). 
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on the federal government than if it sought relief earlier. And there 
are good reasons to believe that American states would in fact delay 
or avoid seeking debt relief as sovereign debtors have historically 
done—perhaps more so. Compared to sovereigns, financially 
embattled American states might be more able to avoid seeking relief 
or addressing underlying financial weaknesses in financial distress 
because states are less vulnerable to acute financial crises.48 States 
tend to be more constrained in their ability incur debt.49 They also 
borrow in dollars, so they are not subject to exchange-rate crises. 
Furthermore, because they are not directly responsible for the 
stability of the banking system, states are not directly and 
independently exposed to the threat of a banking crisis. States may 
also enjoy stronger immunity from suits by creditors, if only because 
they generally do not waive immunity as sovereigns tend to do, and 
this may give them more room to maneuver to avoid an acute crisis.50 
If states in financial distress do delay seeking bankruptcy relief, 
they would likely undermine the utility of bankruptcy law in helping 
to avoid or reduce their need for bailouts from the federal 
government, a primary goal of extending bankruptcy protection to 
states.51 Bankruptcy might be more effective than ad hoc restructuring 
in a moment of crisis, but a state that delayed in seeking relief could 
thereby incur costs that would offset any benefit gained from allowing 
it to seek relief in bankruptcy in the first place. Furthermore, the 
availability of a bankruptcy backstop itself might actually make states 
more comfortable in delaying any effort to restructure their 
obligations until the need to do so becomes unavoidable. Thus, a 
purely voluntary bankruptcy scheme for states may fail to achieve its 
aims and could actually do more harm than good. 
The practical challenges of creating a state bankruptcy regime 
with an involuntary component may also be less forbidding than the 
challenges of creating a similar regime for sovereigns. It would likely 
be easier to design a state bankruptcy regime with an involuntary 
component than it would be to create one for sovereigns. The 
 
 48.  See, e.g., Feibelman, supra note 32, at 152–56. 
 49.  See, e.g., id. at 152–53. 
 50.  See, e.g., id. at 152. 
 51.  See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 325; David Skeel, Testimony Before the Subcomm. 
on TARP, Fin. Servs. and Bailouts of Pub. and Private Programs, Comm. on Oversight and 
Gov’t Reform, 112th Cong. (2011) (“We need a fire department for state fiscal crises that does 
not depend on using a major federal bailout as a backstop.”). 
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underlying state bankruptcy regime could be created through 
amendments to the existing Chapter 952 and could utilize the existing 
U.S. bankruptcy court infrastructure. Nonetheless, the political 
obstacles to state bankruptcy in general, and especially state 
bankruptcy with an involuntary component, may be insurmountable. 
III. DESIGN 
This Part addresses, in very general terms, some of the most 
important issues concerning the design of an involuntary provision in 
a bankruptcy scheme for states. It proposes a model for involuntary 
state bankruptcy under which the federal government has the 
authority to force a state into bankruptcy if the state threatens 
national financial or economic interests; a state forced into 
bankruptcy could be given the option to exit bankruptcy after a brief 
period; the state would enjoy a broad stay of actions against it while in 
bankruptcy; and it would have the opportunity to propose a 
restructuring plan that could bind holdout creditors. Thus, entry would 
be the only involuntary aspect of the regime. To be clear, although this 
Part proposes some design choices, the discussion below is only 
intended to sketch a plausible version of involuntary state bankruptcy 
and thereby make the general idea somewhat harder to dismiss. 
A. Who triggers? 
If policymakers were interested in adopting an involuntary 
bankruptcy procedure for government debtors, they would need to 
address some unique questions of design. While the procedure might 
be adapted from existing provisions allowing for involuntary 
bankruptcy, it would presumably reflect some fundamental 
differences in the nature of commercial and government debtors. 
Most notably, whereas creditors are relatively well-suited to trigger a 
private debtor’s bankruptcy proceeding, the federal government is the 
only entity that could plausibly force a state into bankruptcy. 
For numerous reasons, creditors of a state are not in a good 
position to trigger their debtor’s involuntary bankruptcy. As an initial 
matter, like creditors of private firms, individual creditors of a state 
may not have sufficient incentives to bear the full costs of forcing the 
state into bankruptcy. Furthermore, creditors of a state may be less 
likely than creditors of private firms to collectively internalize the 
 
 52.  See, e.g., Feibelman, supra note 32, at 185. 
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costs and benefits of forcing the state into bankruptcy. Governments 
(like consumers, to some extent) cannot face liquidation and they 
generally repay their creditors from revenues.53 If they delay seeking 
debt relief, states may deplete some assets that creditors might share 
upon liquidation, but that risk is probably not as great as it is for 
creditors of private firms. If not, that removes an opportunity for 
creditors to increase their insolvency-state returns by forcing the state 
into bankruptcy earlier than it would enter bankruptcy voluntarily. 
Relatedly, a government’s creditors may be more likely than 
creditors of private firms to share their debtor’s preference for 
delaying or avoiding debt restructuring, even in the face of financial 
distress. Because their government debtor does not face liquidation, 
and because it may persist with unsustainable levels of indebtedness 
for a long time, they may have better reason to hope that they will 
eventually get repaid in full after a present crisis subsides. This is 
especially true if they expect to take a loss in a debt-restructuring 
process. 
Even more than with consumer debtors, the prospect of a 
government being forced into bankruptcy raises concerns about 
dignity, autonomy, and sovereignty. It is a nearly universal principle 
that private interests are not allowed to direct matters affecting public 
policy.54 After all, private actors are politically unaccountable and they 
are not in a position to balance the interests that a governmental unit 
must serve.55 This helps explain why states enjoy robust sovereign 
immunity from actions of private parties that may affect the state’s 
fiscal or governmental policies.56 Being forced into a bankruptcy 
proceeding would represent a meaningful interference with 
government policy and, potentially, its financial condition. Increasing 
private creditors’ insolvency returns is probably not a sufficient 
 
 53.  See, e.g., Gelpern, supra note 34, at 926 (“With most sovereign assets inaccessible to 
creditors, as a practical matter, claims against sovereigns are paid as they come due from the 
debtor’s primary budget surplus.”). But see, Skeel, supra note 2, at 6–7 (noting that states often 
sell assets to pay creditors when they experience financial distress). In general, the primary risk 
that creditors of sovereign debtors face is that the debtor will continue to borrow, diluting the 
value of existing claims. See Bolton & Skeel, supra note 3, at 788–92. 
 54.  The exceptions to this principle (e.g., industry self-regulation), which are carefully 
circumscribed and still controversial, tend to prove the general rule. 
 55.  See Gelpern, supra note 34, at 909–10 (describing American states’ “residual 
responsibility for the welfare of their citizens”); Feibelman, supra note 32, at 150 (discussing the 
role of government in providing public goods). 
 56.  See, e.g., Emily D. Johnson & Ernest A. Young, The Constitutional Law of State Debt, 
DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 117 (2012). 
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justification for granting private creditors the authority to force a 
state government into bankruptcy. 
The federal government is in a much better position to trigger a 
state’s involuntary bankruptcy. Because state governments serve 
crucial functions and cannot be liquidated, they will ultimately be 
rescued, bailed out, or protected if all else fails, and the federal 
government will fund and coordinate any necessary rescue on behalf 
of the nation and other states. And before any rescue or bailout 
becomes necessary, a state that experiences financial distress will 
likely externalize many costs upon the nation. In fact, because the 
federal government does not have the ability to force a state to seek 
debt relief, states are currently subject to a serious moral hazard.57 If 
they believe that the federal government will bail them out if they get 
into a deep enough hole, they may not try as hard to take the difficult 
actions necessary to avoid financial distress. 
As a result of this structural financial relationship, the federal 
government would internalize many of the benefits and the costs of 
forcing a state into bankruptcy if the state is in or approaching serious 
financial distress.58 Most obviously, it would enjoy the benefits of the 
state seeking early bankruptcy relief by reducing the scope—and 
perhaps the likelihood—of financial support needed from the 
national government. In other words, the ability to force a state into 
bankruptcy could, in theory, reduce or eliminate costs to federal 
taxpayers of a bailout. Perhaps more importantly, if a state’s financial 
distress began to spillover and increase risk of financial distress for 
other states or for the nation, the federal government would have a 
useful tool to address the emerging risk. And unlike dispersed private 
creditors, the federal government would not face a collective action 
problem in obtaining these benefits. 
The federal government would also have to internalize various 
financial and political costs of triggering a state’s bankruptcy. If the 
federal government acted too precipitously in forcing a state into 
bankruptcy, for example, it could impose costs on the state that it 
 
 57.  See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 325; Skeel, supra note 2, at 27. 
 58.  For sovereigns in a monetary or currency union, other countries in the union and 
union institutions like a central bank should be in a similar position. For other sovereign 
nations, international financial institutions—especially the IMF—as well as other countries that 
likely would take on responsibility for rescuing the government (even if they are not its major 
creditors) might be able to internalize the costs and benefits of forcing a nation to undergo debt 
restructuring. 
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would not otherwise have borne. This could actually hasten a federal 
bailout and increase the scope of needed support. Even if an 
involuntary state bankruptcy successfully stabilized the state itself and 
reduced the federal government’s exposure to the state’s financial 
predicament, it could undermine market confidence in other states or 
the national government. 
Forcing a state into bankruptcy could also be politically risky for 
federal officials. It would be a highly salient, dramatic, and 
controversial act, even if it were taken in the context of a state’s acute 
financial distress. It would inevitably raise widespread concerns about 
the legitimacy of the federal role. Setting aside the federalism 
concerns, an involuntary state bankruptcy could be very unpopular 
among voters if it causes immediate negative financial and economic 
effects within the state or beyond. And there would probably not be 
any short-term political upside for federal officials who forced a state 
into bankruptcy. 
As discussed below, such political concerns might cause federal 
officials to delay forcing a state into bankruptcy after the point that 
doing so is appropriate, undermining the purpose of an involuntary 
component. Thus, although some political concerns will inevitably 
affect the calculus, the process of deciding whether to force a state 
into bankruptcy should be insulated from politics to the greatest 
extent possible. Congress or the Executive might create a dedicated 
position or entity to exercise this authority. The position could be 
standing or temporary. Perhaps this authority could be vested in the 
newly created Financial Stability Oversight Council,59 the systemic 
stability regulator created by the Dodd-Frank Act to monitor the 
stability of the financial system. Its voting members include the heads 
of the major federal financial regulators.60 The composition of the 
voting membership of the Council and the importance of the role of 
avoiding systemic crises should give the Council some measure of 
authority and independence from political considerations. But the 
extent of that authority and independence remains to be seen. 
Thus, assuming that the decision to force a state into bankruptcy 
could be at least partially insulated from direct political 
 
 59.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 60.  Id. at § 111. Non-voting members include representative state financial regulators. Id. 
at § 111(b)(2). 
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considerations, the federal government is uniquely situated to trigger 
an involuntary bankruptcy of an American state in financial distress. 
It is in as good a position as any actor (including the state itself) to 
trigger a state’s bankruptcy if the overall benefits of doing so are 
greater than the overall costs. In theory, if given the authority, federal 
officials would only force a state into bankruptcy if they thought they 
could thereby stem the state’s financial deterioration (and thus reduce 
the federal government’s financial exposure to the state) and if they 
thought this benefit would outweigh the various political and financial 
costs to the state and to the nation.  
Given the salient costs and controversy that would surround a 
decision to force a state into bankruptcy, the federal government 
might avoid exercising its authority and, in any event, would probably 
delay forcing a state to file for bankruptcy for some period beyond 
the point that bankruptcy would be beneficial. Even with such 
predictable delay, however, if the federal government forced a state’s 
hand before the state itself would seek relief, then the involuntary 
trigger could be a valuable policy option. Furthermore, the 
involuntary option could be valuable even if not exercised if it 
strengthened the federal government’s hand in persuading a state to 
take actions—perhaps filing for bankruptcy voluntarily or 
aggressively negotiating with creditors and other stakeholders—that 
the state would otherwise be hesitant to take. 
To press the point further (and to generalize beyond the 
American context), it is structurally untenable for a government to be 
ultimately responsible for, or unavoidably subject to, the financial 
position of its subunits and yet have no way to discipline the financial 
behavior of those subunits. This is reflected in the fact, for example, 
that some American states have provided a mechanism by which they 
can force their municipalities and other subunits into receivership or 
something similar.61 Otherwise, states would face responsibility for 
liabilities incurred by their municipalities and have no way to steer 
their subunits into a restructuring process. As the European 
experience now illustrates, federal schemes and monetary unions are 
vulnerable to the extent that they are unable to discipline members’ 
financial affairs ex ante and have limited ability to force subunits to 
 
 61.  See, e.g., Municipalities Financial Recovery Act, 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 11701 
(West 2011); Skeel, supra note 2, at 41–42. 
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seek debt relief ex post.62 
To be sure, federal- or union-level government actors will have 
some leverage over a state or sovereign facing distress even if they 
have no formal power to force action. When financial support or 
rescue becomes necessary, for example, the government can condition 
support on actions that it wants the subunit in question to undertake. 
This is precisely how many reluctant sovereigns are motivated to seek 
debt relief under the current ad hoc approach to sovereign debt 
restructuring: an official financial supporter, most often the IMF, 
essentially conditions financial support on the sovereign debtor 
obtaining debt relief from private creditors.63 
Again, the current European crisis provides a case in point, 
though perhaps it also represents a counterpoint. Germany and other 
members of the European Monetary Union have expressly 
conditioned their support for Greece on it obtaining relief from its 
private creditors.64 And these countries have ratcheted up the amount 
of “private involvement” they think is necessary.65 In some ways, then, 
union-level actors and other members of the union may have nudged 
Greece toward more aggressive debt relief. At the same time, 
however, union-level institutions, the European Central Bank in 
particular, also appear to have resisted some aggressive approaches to 
debt restructuring.66 
 
 62.  As a dramatic reflection of this, German officials recently proposed that an E.U. 
commission have the power to veto Greek budgetary expenditures. See, e.g., Peter Spiegel and 
Kerin Hope, Call for EU to Control Greek Budget, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2012, 9:20 PM), 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/33ab91f0-4913-11e1-88f0-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1p6hPFBAt. 
 63.  See, e.g., Feibelman, supra note 32, at 169; Gelpern, supra note 34, at 940; see also infra 
note 74. 
 64.  See, e.g., Andrea Thomas, Germany’s Merkel Satisfied with Greek PSI Participation, 
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 9, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20120309-705803.html. 
 65.  See Jan Strupczewski, New Greek PSI Haircut Around 30–50 Percent, REUTERS (Oct. 
12, 2011, 6:49 PM), available at http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/10/12/uk-eurozone-greece-
haircut-idUKTRE79B3HE20111012 (noting that the expected haircut on Greek debt had 
increased from 21% to 30–50%); Agustino Fontevecchia, Greek Debt Deal Will Force 
Bondholders To Take ‘Voluntary’ 70% Haircut, FORBES (Jan. 23, 2012, 5:22 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/afontevecchia/2012/01/23/greek-debt-deal-will-force-bondholders-to 
-take-voluntary-70-haircut/ (reporting the haircut on Greek debt as approaching seventy 
percent). 
 66.  It is possible, for example, that the European Central Bank’s reluctance for Greece to 
undertake an aggressive approach to debt restructuring delayed that country’s efforts to seek 
meaningful debt relief. See Joseph Stiglitz, Capturing the ECB, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Feb. 6, 
2012), http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/capturing-the-ecb (pointing out a number 
of ways in which the ECB resisted a more aggressive effort to restructure Greek debt). 
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B. When? 
Assuming that some arm of the federal government will have 
authority to trigger an involuntary bankruptcy provision for states, 
eligibility will present another threshold challenge. Under what 
circumstances should a state be subject to involuntary bankruptcy? At 
the broadest level of generality, eligibility should be a function of the 
degree of a state’s financial distress. The case for involuntary 
bankruptcy is strongest when it appears likely that the federal 
government will have to provide substantial or extraordinary financial 
support to the state. It is also at that point that the federal 
government will have the most direct stake in forcing the state to 
resolve its financial distress. 
There are a variety of ways to design a test that would help 
determine when these substantive criteria are met, none of which are 
ideal. The U.S. Bankruptcy Code provides, for example, that failure to 
pay debts as they come due is part of the eligibility criteria for 
involuntary bankruptcy of private debtors.67 Such a failure can 
certainly reflect financial distress, but it should probably not be a 
necessary component of eligibility for government debtors. Given 
their taxing power, governments can often avoid defaulting on 
particular obligations even while they are experiencing financial 
distress.68 
Perhaps eligibility for involuntary state bankruptcy could hinge on 
solvency: a state could be subject to involuntary bankruptcy if it 
became insolvent, a traditional standard for involuntary bankruptcy 
or insolvency proceedings.69 But insolvency is a debatable basis for 
involuntary bankruptcy in general,70 and it is especially imperfect for 
government debtors. On the one hand, for example, acute liquidity 
constraints could require the rescue of a solvent government debtor. 
On the other hand, a government debtor could have an unsustainable 
level of debt by some metric but survive indefinitely without the need 
for financial rescue. Furthermore, insolvency is a notoriously inapt 
 
 67.  See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 68.  See supra Part II.A. and accompanying text. 
 69.  See Block-Lieb, supra note 17, at 367 (noting that under pre-1978 bankruptcy law in 
the United States it was presumed that only an insolvent party could be subject to involuntary 
bankruptcy). 
 70.  See id. at 374–408 (criticizing insolvency as a standard and discussing JACKSON, supra 
note 17); see also McConnell, supra note 2, at 235 (suggesting that giving a bankruptcy court the 
authority to determine whether a state is insolvent might give it some power over the state’s 
sovereign ability to conduct fiscal affairs). 
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concept for governmental debtors, and questions of solvency in this 
context are more accurately cast in terms of the relative sustainability 
of a government’s obligations. If sustainability is a better conceptual 
framework for assessing a government’s financial condition, however, 
it is still very difficult to measure.71 
Given the functional weakness of available metrics or proxies, it 
may be best to simply articulate the test for eligibility for involuntary 
bankruptcy as “likely to need extraordinary financial assistance from 
the federal government or to threaten stability of the national 
economy.” This would at least underscore the primary justifications 
for allowing the federal government to force a state into bankruptcy 
and might focus the inquiry on those justifications. As a practical 
matter, because the question is not likely to be litigated,72 whichever 
actor is given authority to force a state into bankruptcy will have 
significant discretion to determine when to do so. Given the stakes of 
triggering an involuntary state bankruptcy, that authority would not 
be exercised lightly; if it were ever exercised, there would probably 
not be much question about whether the standard is met. For reasons 
noted above, there may be greater reason to worry that the federal 
government would delay in triggering a state bankruptcy beyond 
when it should do so than there is reason to worry that it would act 
precipitously. 
Anticipating the constitutional concerns discussed below, it might 
be desirable to grant states the option to exit bankruptcy after a short 
period of time if the involuntary trigger is employed. This would 
certainly blunt the involuntary nature of the scheme, and it might also 
make the involuntary component less controversial in practice. One 
might assume that any state forced into bankruptcy would decide to 
exit as soon as it were given the opportunity. There are reasons to 
believe, however, that officials and citizens of a state in financial 
distress would quietly or grudgingly approve of being involuntarily 
subject to bankruptcy, even if they might publicly complain. If states, 
like other debtors, delay seeking beneficial debt relief until they have 
no other choice, they may be grateful that someone else has the 
ability to force the issue at an earlier point in their crisis. 
 
 71.  See, e.g., Adam Feibelman, Contract, Priority, and Odious Debt, 85 N.C. L. REV. 727, 
734 n.25 (2007); see also Gelpern, supra note 34, at 926–27 (discussing debates over debt 
sustainability and noting the lack of a solvency metric for sovereigns). 
 72.  See infra note 74. 
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In that case, the state officials would not bear responsibility for 
pulling the trigger, but the state would obtain the benefits of 
bankruptcy law in stemming its financial distress and, especially, in 
enabling it to restructure obligations that might be harder to 
restructure outside of bankruptcy.73 Thus, a state forced into 
bankruptcy might not exercise the discretion to exit; perhaps it would 
rarely do so. Furthermore, if a state were inclined to exit bankruptcy, 
and if the federal government deemed a successful restructuring 
important enough, the federal government might condition federal 
bailout support on the state’s remaining in bankruptcy and seeking 
relief thereunder.74 
C. Automatic Stay 
Even if a state did exit bankruptcy after, say, a week or two (if the 
option is available), it might still benefit substantially from its brief, 
involuntary sojourn in bankruptcy. Bankruptcy law generally provides 
some form of injunction against nearly all collection efforts and other 
actions against the debtor upon the initiation of the bankruptcy 
proceedings.75 A stay on creditor actions gives the debtor some 
breathing room, usually in the wake of a period of crisis or near crisis. 
This respite may enable the debtor to act more deliberately in 
addressing its financial circumstances. Significant for present 
purposes, the stay can also force creditors, debtors, and other 
stakeholders to reassess their respective financial relationships and to 
recognize the extent of their interrelated fates, which can in turn 
facilitate negotiated restructuring or settlement. If states and their 
 
 73.  See Skeel, supra note 2, at 9–22 (describing the specific benefits of restructuring state 
debt in bankruptcy). 
 74.  In fact, it is possible that the federal government would have power enough under the 
Spending Clause to insist that a state voluntarily file for bankruptcy if that were made available. 
This approach would serve most of the same functions as an involuntary bankruptcy provision. 
But it would likely be somewhat more constraining—the federal government would presumably 
have to put money on the table first and then hope that the state needed the offered funds 
enough to comply. An involuntary bankruptcy approach allows the federal government to 
withhold a formal offer of financial support until the state is already in the bankruptcy process. 
The federal government might be able to use its spending power to force a state to make some 
efforts to restructure obligations outside of bankruptcy. See, e.g., Gelpern, supra note 34, at 940. 
But if the state is attempting to restructure claims outside of bankruptcy, it may run afoul of the 
Contract Clause. It is worth noting that the Supreme Court is currently considering the scope of 
the federal government’s spending power in its review of the constitutionality of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010. See generally U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human 
Servs. v. Florida, No. 11-398 (U.S. argued Mar. 26, 2012). 
 75.  See, e.g., 11 U.S.C.A. § 362 (West 2011) (including the automatic stay provision of U.S. 
bankruptcy law). 
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counterparties can successfully negotiate to restructure the state’s 
obligations in the initial period of an involuntary bankruptcy, this 
would make the other machinery of a bankruptcy unnecessary. 
Consistent with existing U.S. bankruptcy law, the stay should not 
impair or interfere with any exercise of governmental police or 
regulatory power. Beyond this limitation, however, any stay or 
injunction should be more extensive than a state’s constitutional 
immunity from suit. Some commentators have proposed that states’ 
immunity may eliminate the need for a stay in bankruptcy,76 but 
immunity is subject to various exceptions.77 Most notably, states can 
waive immunity ex ante and claimants may be able to proceed under 
Ex parte Young78 for injunctive relief. Furthermore, unlike an 
automatic stay, immunity does not sanction a party for bringing suit or 
taking other actions to try to collect an obligation, and such actions 
can be detrimental to a restructuring process even if they are likely to 
fail on the merits. 
For similar reasons, a state’s waiver of immunity from suit should 
not be construed as a waiver of the stay. Again, a bankruptcy stay is 
designed to halt even those actions that creditors and other 
stakeholders are entitled to take outside of bankruptcy. Unlike 
private debtors, however, a state might be allowed to consent to 
particular collection efforts after it is forced into bankruptcy, 
especially if an exception to the stay protected the state’s police or 
regulatory interests.79 
D. Plan 
The inclusion of an involuntary trigger in a state bankruptcy 
regime might influence the design of the bankruptcy machinery that 
would apply to states in general. The possibility that a state might 
enter bankruptcy involuntarily, even if it has the unqualified 
discretion to exit, might provide some reason to design a state 
bankruptcy regime that is unobtrusive and otherwise as voluntary as 
possible (if only to make discretionary exit less likely). Procedurally, 
 
 76.  See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 326; Gelpern, supra note 34, at 902–05. 
 77.  See, e.g., Johnson & Young, supra note 56. 
 78.  209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
 79.  Under U.S. bankruptcy law, debtors are not allowed to waive the automatic stay. See 
Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking Freedom of Contract: A Bankruptcy Paradigm, 77 TEX. L. REV. 
515, 524–34 (1999) (discussing doctrinal and scholarly debates over the enforcement of 
contracting with respect to bankruptcy, especially agreements to waiving the automatic stay). 
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the regime could be as skeletal as an automatic stay and a forum in 
which the state can voluntarily negotiate with counterparties. A state 
might have the authority, but not be required, to submit a plan of 
restructuring. The plan could provide for impairing claims against the 
state, presumably with the consent of some percentage of creditors 
and perhaps with judicial review for fair treatment.80 
Even if it were not required to do so, there are reasons to believe 
a state would take the opportunity to submit a restructuring plan once 
it had been forced into bankruptcy. First, the state may then have a 
significant amount of leverage over creditors and other stakeholders 
who are subject to the bankruptcy stay and who now fully realize the 
extent of the state’s financial challenges. Second, the opportunity to 
submit a plan of restructuring would likely allow the state to 
restructure obligations in bankruptcy that would be harder to 
restructure outside of bankruptcy.81 This is because, among other 
things, a restructuring of claims against a state under federal 
bankruptcy law would likely not violate the Contract Clause,82 while 
actions by the state itself outside of bankruptcy might do so. 
E. Summary 
If a bankruptcy regime for states includes an involuntary 
component, the involuntary trigger should only be given to officials of 
the federal government, perhaps the Financial Stability Oversight 
Council. The federal government should have the authority to force a 
state into bankruptcy only if there is a reasonable chance that the 
state will need financial support from the federal government or if the 
state’s financial crisis threatens the stability of the national economy. 
The federal government might delay in forcing a state into 
bankruptcy, but there is at least some reason to believe that it would 
pull the trigger sooner than the state. Even if it would not do so, the 
threat that it might pull the trigger could encourage the state to act 
sooner than it otherwise might. A state forced into bankruptcy could 
be given the discretion to exit after a short period of time, during 
which it would benefit from a stay on all proceedings against it. The 
 
 80.  This is similar to Steven Schwarcz’s proposal for a “minimalist” state bankruptcy 
regime. See generally Schwarcz, supra note 2. His model, which would be a free-standing 
bankruptcy regime for states, would provide for “across-the-board supermajority voting” among 
creditors that could bind holdouts. See id. at 331. 
 81.  See supra notes 74–75 and accompanying text. 
 82.  See, e.g., Skeel, supra note 2, at 24; McConnell, supra note 2, at 234–35. 
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bankruptcy regime should provide an opportunity for a state to 
voluntarily propose a plan of restructuring, which, if confirmed, could 
impair claims against it pursuant to federal law. 
Again, the model of involuntary state bankruptcy proposed above 
is premised on an assumption that, in some circumstances, state 
officials would not themselves pull the bankruptcy trigger when it 
would be most beneficial to do so, even when they may want to take 
advantage of procedural and substantive features of federal 
bankruptcy law. State officials in such circumstances might exercise 
the option to exit if forced into bankruptcy. Yet they might complain 
loudly and then employ the mechanism for obtaining debt relief that 
federal bankruptcy would afford. 
IV. IS IT CONSTITUTIONAL? 
This essay has deferred addressing the constitutional issues posed 
by involuntary bankruptcy for states until this final Part for three 
reasons. First, it is hopefully useful to have described a particular 
model of involuntary bankruptcy against which to weigh 
constitutional concerns. Second, addressing these constitutional issues 
is only a secondary goal of this essay, which is primarily concerned 
with evaluating the potential benefits of involuntary state bankruptcy. 
And third, the analysis of these issues below is tentative and modest. 
This Part does not argue confidently that an involuntary bankruptcy 
provision for states would be constitutional. Rather, it argues, contra 
to nearly universal consensus, that such a provision would not be 
obviously unconstitutional and that the question is closer than courts 
and commentators appear to assume. 
Thus far, the emerging literature on state bankruptcy includes 
debate over whether extending a voluntary bankruptcy regime to 
states would violate the Constitution.83 Writers on both sides of the 
debate limit discussion to a voluntary regime, with proponents 
arguing confidently that allowing states to voluntarily file for 
bankruptcy should pass constitutional muster.84 To date, skeptics of 
this claim are somewhat muted,85 and thus the weight of commentary 
seems to lean toward finding a voluntary state bankruptcy regime 
 
 83.  See generally, e.g., McConnell, supra note 2; Skeel, supra note 2; Solan, supra note 2. 
 84.  See, e.g., Skeel, supra note 2, at 23–25. 
 85.  See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 2, at 236 (arguing that the answer to whether a state 
bankruptcy regime would be constitutional “is not obvious either way”). 
(12) FEIBELMAN (DO NOT DELETE) 8/20/2012  1:33 PM 
106 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 7:1 
constitutional. Proponents and skeptics alike avoid discussion of an 
involuntary regime, strongly suggesting that they believe such a 
regime would be unconstitutional. And, as discussed below, this view 
has support in dicta from relevant Supreme Court authority. 
This nearly universal view of the constitutionality of involuntary 
state bankruptcy has not yet been directly and carefully examined, 
however. This Part proposes that the U.S. Constitution can 
accommodate a carefully drawn statute that allows the federal 
government to force a state into a bankruptcy regime that is voluntary 
in all other respects if a bailout or national financial crisis is eminent. 
As explained below, the sovereignty of states as reflected in the Tenth 
Amendment represents the primary obstacle to this proposition.86 
The Tenth Amendment of the Constitution provides: “The powers 
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited 
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people.”87 The Amendment has famously been described as a truism.88 
But the scope and meaning of this provision has shifted significantly 
throughout history. This Part assesses involuntary bankruptcy for 
states in light of three strands of Tenth Amendment doctrine: cases 
analyzing the constitutionality of the U.S. municipal bankruptcy 
regime, cases prohibiting the commandeering of state regulation, and 
cases articulating a general principle of state sovereignty. 
A. Municipal Bankruptcy Cases 
Recent analysis of the constitutionality of state bankruptcy rightly 
focuses on a pair of Supreme Court opinions from the middle of the 
last century concerning the constitutionality of allowing 
municipalities to obtain relief under federal bankruptcy law.89 The first 
of these cases, Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement 
District,90 struck down an initial municipal bankruptcy regime.91 It held 
that the regime, which allowed municipalities to voluntarily file for 
bankruptcy if state law permitted, violated the Contract Clause92 and 
 
 86.  This essay assumes that an involuntary state bankruptcy regime triggered by the 
federal government would not violate the Eleventh Amendment, which does not prohibit 
actions against a state by the federal government. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
 87.  U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 88.  United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941). 
 89.  See generally, e.g., Skeel, supra note 2; McConnell, supra note 2. 
 90.  298 U.S. 513 (1936). 
 91.  Id. at 532. 
 92.  “The Constitution was careful to provide that ‘no State shall . . . pass any . . . Law 
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the Tenth Amendment.93 Regarding the latter, without much 
explanation, the Court found that “application of the statutory 
provisions now before us might materially restrict [a state’s] control 
over its fiscal affairs.”94 In dicta the Court stated: “If federal 
bankruptcy laws can be extended to respondent, why not to the state? 
If voluntary proceedings may be permitted, so may involuntary 
ones . . . .”95 Assuming (without deciding) that involuntary bankruptcy 
would be impermissible, the Court thus reasoned that the voluntary 
regime was unconstitutional. 
Dissenting in Ashton, Justice Cardozo argued that impairment of 
contracts under federal law, even if assented to by the states, does not 
impinge the Contract Clause.96 He also argued that the statute in 
question was “framed with sedulous regard to the structure of the 
federal system,” emphasizing the voluntary nature of the provision 
and the deference to state authorization.97 Responding to the 
majority’s conflating voluntary and involuntary regimes, he wrote: 
The question is not here whether the statute would be valid if it 
made provision for involuntary bankruptcy, dispensing with the 
consent of the state and with that of the bankrupt subdivision. For 
present purposes, one may assume that there would be in such 
conditions a dislocation of that balance between the powers of the 
states and the powers of the central government which is essential 
to our federal system.98 
 
 
 
impairing the Obligation of Contracts.’ This she may not do under the form of a 
bankruptcy act or otherwise. Nor do we think she can accomplish the same end by granting 
any permission necessary to enable Congress so to do.” Id. at 531 (citation omitted). 
 93.  “Neither consent nor submission by the states can enlarge the powers of 
Congress; none can exist except those which are granted. The sovereignty of the state 
essential to its proper functioning under the Federal Constitution cannot be surrendered; it 
cannot be taken away by any form of legislation. Like any sovereignty, a state may 
voluntarily consent to be sued . . . . But nothing in this tends to support the view that the 
federal government, acting under the bankruptcy clause, may impose its will and impair 
state powers—pass laws inconsistent with the idea of sovereignty.” Id. (citation omitted). 
 94.  Id. at 530. 
 95.  Id. Interestingly, there is now a growing consensus that the first of these statements is 
actually correct, whereas the latter is not given serious consideration. 
 96.  Id. at 542 (Cardozo, J., dissenting). 
 97.  Id. at 538. 
 98.  Id. “Sufficient reasons do not appear for excluding political subdivisions from the 
bankruptcy jurisdiction if the jurisdiction is so exerted as to maintain the equilibrium between 
state and national power.” Id. at 540. 
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While Cardozo assumed “for present purposes” that an 
involuntary provision would be unconstitutional, however, it is not 
clear whether he was confident that involuntary bankruptcy (or 
voluntary state bankruptcy, for that matter) would in fact create an 
improper balance between the states and the federal government. 
After Ashton, Congress amended the municipal bankruptcy 
regime to provide explicitly that a bankruptcy court could not 
interfere with the fiscal affairs of any governmental unit that filed for 
bankruptcy.99 The new regime was upheld in United States v. Bekins.100 
The Court found that: 
The statute is carefully drawn so as not to impinge upon the 
sovereignty of the State. The State retains control of its fiscal 
affairs. The bankruptcy power is exercised in relation to a matter 
normally within its province, and only in a case where the action of 
the taxing agency in carrying out a plan of composition approved 
by the bankruptcy court is authorized by state law.101 
Again, the Court leaned heavily on the voluntary nature of the 
municipal bankruptcy regime.102 But again, any suggestion in that case 
that an involuntary regime would be unconstitutional is at most dicta. 
The basic principle one can derive from Ashton and Bekins is that 
there is a constitutional limit on the scope of any bankruptcy regime 
that extends to state governmental units. These cases strongly suggest 
that if a regime does not meaningfully interfere with a state’s police 
and regulatory authority and relies on a voluntary trigger, it would be 
within that constitutional limit. More generally, the fundamental 
question as framed by Cardozo in Ashton and the majority in Bekins 
is whether a scheme upsets the proper “balance between the powers 
of the states and the powers of the central government,”103 a balance 
that should be “to the advantage of the people who are citizens of 
both.”104 
Although these cases provide a backdrop and reference points for 
analyzing the constitutionality of a state bankruptcy regime and an 
involuntary component thereof, they are probably of limited value in 
that regard. As discussed below, there have been many developments 
 
 99.  See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 2, at 230. 
 100.  304 U.S. 27 (1938). 
 101.  Id. at 51. 
 102.  Id. at 51–52. 
 103.  Ashton, 298 U.S. at 542 (Cardozo, J., dissenting). 
 104.  Bekins, 304 U.S. at 53. 
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in relevant constitutional doctrines since the 1930s; if the municipal 
bankruptcy cases provide any guidance, it will presumably be filtered 
through the lens of more contemporary Tenth Amendment 
jurisprudence. 
B. Anti-Commandeering 
One of the enduring principles of contemporary Tenth 
Amendment jurisprudence is that “Congress may not simply 
‘commandee[r] the legislative processes of the States by directly 
compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory 
program.’”105 Early cases reflecting this principle include Coyle v. 
Smith,106 in which the Court held that Congress could not direct where 
a state located its capitol.107 Coyle drew on prior cases articulating a 
more general principle that the federal government has limited ability 
to direct state governmental actions.108 The Court refined the 
conceptual contours of this anti-commandeering principle in Hodel v. 
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association109 and FERC v. 
Mississippi,110 cases involving the Surface Mining Control Act of 1977 
and the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, respectively. 
Although aspects of both Acts strongly encouraged states to take 
particular regulatory actions, the Court held in each case that the act 
in question did not command or compel the states to take any such 
actions. 
In New York v. United States,111 the Court held that provisions of 
the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 
contravened the constitutional prohibition on the federal 
government’s commandeering of state governments.112 That Act was 
designed to encourage states to dispose of low-level radioactive waste 
generated within their borders.113 It employed three strategies: 
 
 105.  New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992) (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface 
Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)). 
 106.  221 U.S. 559 (1911). 
 107.  Id. at 565. 
 108.  See generally, e.g., Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. 71 (1868); Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 
700 (1868); see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905–18 (1997) (reviewing the historical 
record and finding no evidence from the founding period or from early American history of 
Congress enacting laws forcing state executive action). 
 109.  452 U.S. 264 (1981). 
 110.  456 U.S. 742 (1982). 
 111.  505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
 112.  Id. at 188. 
 113.  Id. at 150–51. 
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providing a set of financial incentives for states to make arrangements 
for disposal of waste, limiting access of states that did not make 
satisfactory arrangements with disposal facilities in other states, and 
requiring states that failed to make arrangements for waste disposal 
by a target date to “take title” of waste generated within the state.114 
The Court found that the first two strategies were permissible 
incentives to encourage state governmental action, but it found that 
the “take title” provision effectively commandeered state 
governments by forcing them to take responsibility of disposing of 
waste generated within their borders.115 
More recently, in Printz v. United States,116 the Court found that 
interim provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act of 
1993 violated the anti-commandeering doctrine under the Tenth 
Amendment.117 Provisions of the Act required state law enforcement 
officers to make efforts to determine within the Act’s waiting period 
whether purchasers were allowed to possess firearms.118 The Court 
found these provisions to be unconstitutional commandeering of state 
executive officers.119 
If the involuntary bankruptcy scheme proposed above is deemed 
to be commandeering, then it would likely be prohibited. But the 
scheme is carefully drawn to avoid running afoul of the anti-
commandeering doctrine. It would not allow the federal government 
to force a state to do anything other than enter bankruptcy. And this 
probably cannot be construed as “commandeering” the state’s 
regulatory power. The federal government would not be using the 
state as an instrument for a federal regulatory agency or compelling it 
to enforce a federal regulatory program; it would be imposing a legal 
regime upon the state. The appropriate constitutional question, then, 
is not one about commandeering but whether the federal government 
has authority to impose its power upon a state in this fashion. 
C. General Principles of State Sovereignty 
As indicated above, the anti-commandeering doctrine derives 
from a broader constitutional principle of state sovereignty reflected 
 
 114.  Id. at 152–54. 
 115.  Id. at 174–77. 
 116.  521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 117.  Id. at 933. 
 118.  Id. at 902–04. 
 119.  Id. at 933–34. 
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primarily in the Tenth Amendment. The precise content of this 
principle, however, is difficult to identify, especially because the 
Supreme Court has charted an unsteady course in this area. 
In National League of Cities v. Usery,120 the Court articulated a 
robust doctrine of state sovereignty.121 In that case, the Court 
considered the constitutionality of provisions of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act that imposed minimum wage and maximum hour 
regulations on state employees.122 Drawing upon the same line of 
cases that supported the holding in Coyle,123 the Court found that the 
principle of state sovereignty reflected in the Tenth Amendment 
prohibited Congress from imposing such requirements on state 
governments.124 It held that “insofar as the challenged amendments 
operate to directly displace the States’ freedom to structure integral 
operations in areas of traditional governmental functions, they are not 
within the authority granted Congress by Art. I, s 8, cl. 3.”125 Quoting 
Coyle, the majority opinion reasoned, “[i]f Congress may withdraw 
from the States the authority to make those fundamental employment 
decisions upon which their systems for performance of these 
functions must rest, we think there would be little left of the States’ 
‘separate and independent existence.’”126 
Noteworthy for present purposes, the Court reconciled its holding 
with that of Fry v. United States,127 which upheld provisions of the 
Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 that imposed wage freezes on 
state and local government employees.128 The general provisions of the 
FLSA under attack in National League of Cities and the wage freezes 
in Fry were different, the Court reasoned, because the latter was a 
measured response to a national economic emergency. In 
distinguishing Fry, the National League of Cities Court stated: “The 
limits imposed upon the commerce power when Congress seeks to 
apply it to the States are not so inflexible as to preclude temporary 
enactments tailored to combat a national emergency.”129 
 
 120.  426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
 121.  Id. at 849–50. 
 122.  Id. at 845–46. 
 123.  Id. at 844–45. 
 124.  Id. at 851–52. 
 125.  Id. at 851. 
 126.  Id. (quoting Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 580 (1911)). 
 127.  421 U.S. 542 (1975). 
 128.  National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852–53. 
 129.  Id. at 853 (quoting Fry, 421 U.S. at 548). 
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The enactment at issue [in Fry] was occasioned by an extremely 
serious problem which endangered the well-being of all the 
component parts of our federal system and which only collective 
action by the National Government might forestall. The means 
selected were carefully drafted so as not to interfere with the 
States’ freedom beyond a very limited, specific period of time. The 
effect of the across-the-board freeze authorized by that Act, 
moreover, displaced no state choices as to how governmental 
operations should be structured, nor did it force the States to 
remake such choices themselves. . . . Finally, the Economic 
Stabilization Act operated to reduce the pressures upon state 
budgets rather than increase them.130 
The limitation on Congress’s Article I powers under National 
League of Cities was subsequently characterized as applying where 
these four components obtained: Congress regulates “states as states”; 
the statute in question touches upon matters that are “indisputably 
‘attributes of state sovereignty’”; the statute impairs states’ 
“traditional governmental functions”; and the federal interest does 
not “justif[y] state submission.”131 
Shortly thereafter, however, the Court swept aside this doctrinal 
formulation and overruled National League of Cities. In Garcia v. San 
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,132 the Court reconsidered the 
constitutionality of the provisions of the FLSA that it had invalidated 
in National League of Cities.133 Noting the difficulty lower courts were 
having in assessing whether federal statutes impaired “traditional 
governmental functions” under the existing doctrine, the Court 
effectively reconceptualized the underlying constitutional issue at 
hand.134 As the majority opinion stated, “the fact that the States 
remain sovereign as to all powers not vested in Congress or denied 
them by the Constitution offers no guidance about where the frontier 
between state and federal power lies.”135 Thus, “we have no license to 
employ freestanding conceptions of state sovereignty when measuring 
congressional authority under the Commerce Clause.”136 Rather than 
employ such conceptions, the Court held: 
 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 537 (1985) (quoting Hodel 
v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 287–88 (1981)). 
 132.  Id. 
 133.  Id. at 536. 
 134.  Id. at 538. 
 135.  Id. at 550. 
 136.  Id. 
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Apart from the limitation on federal authority inherent in the 
delegated nature of Congress’ Article I powers, the principal 
means chosen by the Framers to ensure the role of the States in 
the federal system lies in the structure of the Federal Government 
itself. . . . State sovereign interests, then, are more properly 
protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the 
federal system than by judicially created limitations on federal 
power.137 
This articulation of state sovereignty has survived since Garcia. It 
is noteworthy, however, that the composition of the Court has 
changed since then in ways that might give reason to question the 
viability of Garcia in years to come. Thus, it seems prudent to assess 
the constitutionality of a provision for involuntary state bankruptcy 
under both Garcia as well as National League of Cities. 
Under Garcia, forcing a state into bankruptcy should not violate 
the Tenth Amendment unless there is some reason to believe that the 
underlying structure of the federal government has not protected the 
state’s interest. If the provision were enacted pursuant to 
conventional legislative procedures, it seems hard to imagine how an 
objection could be framed pursuant to the concept of state 
sovereignty under Garcia. 
Considering the scheme in light of National League Cities presents 
a much harder question. On the one hand, it is clear that forcing a 
state into bankruptcy is a significant intrusion upon the state’s 
sovereignty. And it would likely cause the state to experience some 
financial and political disruptions. On the other hand, the National 
League of Cities doctrine recognized that such an intrusion was only 
one factor in the relevant analysis.138 That doctrine considered the 
federal interest that occasioned treading upon states’ sovereignty and 
expressly recognized that the federal government could breach state 
sovereignty to avert a national emergency or address a threat to “the 
well-being of all the component parts of our federal system.”139 An 
involuntary bankruptcy scheme for states as modeled above would be 
narrowly tailored to protect such a national interest. It would impose 
upon states’ sovereignty by forcing them into bankruptcy only if they 
threatened national financial or economic stability, and it would 
include no other involuntary measures. 
 
 137.  Id. at 550–52. 
 138.  See supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
 139.  Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 853 (1976). 
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D. Summary 
The basic constitutional principle common to these three strands 
of Tenth Amendment doctrine is that American states enjoy some 
meaningful degree of sovereignty within our federal system, but this 
degree of sovereignty is far from complete. The Constitution envisions 
that states are only quasi-sovereign.140 The structure of American 
government envisions, for example, that states’ power to regulate 
most commercial activity is subject to federal override pursuant to the 
Commerce Clause.141 The federal government controls many activities 
that would be governed by fully sovereign states, including 
immigration, foreign policy, defense, and monetary policy. 
As explained above, a state bankruptcy regime with an 
involuntary component can be designed to almost completely avoid 
interfering with states’ governmental policies or functions. It is clear, 
however, that the threshold involuntary component itself would be a 
significant interference with a state government policy—whether to 
seek bankruptcy protection. But this only begins the constitutional 
analysis. Would this necessarily upset the appropriate balance of 
power between the state and federal governments? If the premise of 
the provision is that it could only be triggered if the state threatened 
financial harm to the national government or to other states, then the 
question seems to be a difficult one. The imposition on the state is 
real, but it presupposes a looming national threat stemming from the 
state. If one considers the real and significant dangers that a state in 
acute financial crisis could pose to the nation, the case for 
interference with state power does not seem clearly implausible.142 At 
the very least, the issue seems close enough that the constitutional 
question cannot be brushed aside, and, arguably, the burden lies with 
those who would argue against allowing the federal government to 
force a state into bankruptcy if that became necessary to avoid a 
national crisis. 
 
 
 140.  See Gelpern, supra note 34, at 896–925 (describing quasi-sovereigns and comparing 
them to private debtors and other types of public debtors). 
 141.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 142.  See Solan, supra note 2, at 238–40 (making a similar point with respect to allowing 
states to voluntarily file for bankruptcy). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Like private debtors, sovereign nations predictably delay or avoid 
seeking debt relief well beyond the point that such relief would be 
beneficial to them and to other stakeholders. If an American state in 
financial distress behaved similarly, the costs of its delay could 
substantially increase the likelihood, and the likely scope, of a federal 
bailout. If so, a purely voluntary bankruptcy regime for American 
states would fail to meet its primary objectives. And if the availability 
of bankruptcy relief increases states’ moral hazard, a voluntary 
regime could end up doing more harm than good. 
If bankruptcy law is extended to American states, it should include 
an involuntary component. This essay describes a minimalist model of 
involuntary bankruptcy that would allow the federal government to 
force a state into bankruptcy if the state is likely to need substantial 
financial support or if it is threatening the nation’s financial and 
economic stability. Beyond this, every other aspect of the regime as 
modeled would be voluntary. A state forced into bankruptcy would 
have the option to exit after a very brief period of time. If it did not 
exit, it would have the ability to propose a restructuring plan that 
could bind objecting holdouts without violating the Contract Clause. 
The federal government might delay in forcing a state into 
bankruptcy, but the availability of an involuntary trigger could at least 
increase the chances of a more timely bankruptcy proceeding. This in 
turn could encourage states to be more careful to avoid financial 
distress ex ante and motivate other stakeholders to renegotiate their 
claims ex post if a state experiences financial distress. 
An involuntary bankruptcy regime designed in this fashion might 
withstand constitutional scrutiny. To be sure, forcing a state into 
bankruptcy would interfere with the state’s sovereignty and raise 
constitutional concerns. But if the regime were otherwise voluntary, 
this interference would be limited to the state’s entry into the 
bankruptcy system. And, in any event, American states’ constitutional 
sovereignty is qualified by existential needs of the nation. Like a 
sovereign state in a monetary union, an American state would 
inevitably externalize its financial distress upon the larger 
governmental unit, potentially destabilizing the national economy. 
Tenth Amendment doctrine allows for emergency intrusions upon 
states’ sovereignty, and an involuntary state bankruptcy regime that 
could be triggered only if a state is threatening the financial or 
economic welfare or stability of the nation should meet this test. 
